Where controversies should be more amenable to empirical test is in assessing the agro-economic utility of technologies based on molecular breeding, or recombinant DNA techniques -typically lumped together in political discourse as 'GMOs.' There are two nested but separable questions, one agronomic, one economic. Does a particular transgenic cultivar do what genetic engineering designed it to do? If so, does improved agronomic performance increase returns sufficiently to justify a higher cost of production, if production costs rise?
Bt cotton was India's first transgenic crop. Our concern here is with the widely-publicized claim of that 'Bt cotton has failed.' This charge originates with a coalition of NGOs, often part of transnational activist networks such as that fostered by Greenpeace. It explicitly claims that: a) the technology harms rather than helps farmer yields and b) drives farmers into debt because of agronomic failure and high seed prices -often resulting in catastrophe: sale of body parts, suicide. Proponents of transgenic cotton argue that studies show the same success in India that is apparent in China and other countries (James 2002) . The political debate between 'miracle seeds' and 'suicide seeds' is reflected in competing empirical studies.
This issue is of great developmental consequence. If critics are right, the vast sums invested by the Government of India in biotechnology as a project of the developmental state promise only further misery for India's rural poor. If proponents are right, technological change offers one of the real paths out of the classic poverty trap: a crisis of low yields, low returns, low investment, low yields. How does one settle this dispute?
T TH HE E ' 'F FA AI IL LU UR RE E O OF F B BT T C CO OT TT TO ON N' ' --A AN ND D I IT TS S I IR RO ON NI IC C A AD DO OP PT TI IO ON N B BY Y F FA AR RM ME ER RS S
Much of the world, especially in the organized opposition to globalization, believes that farmer suicides are increasing in India, and that Bt cotton has contributed; the discourse is of 'seeds of death' or 'suicide seeds.' In Curitiba, Brazil in 2006, transgenic cotton seeds in India were characterized not only as 'homicidal' but even 'genocidal.' As the opening quotation in this essay indicates, Warangal district in the South Indian state of Andhra Pradesh has been singled out as the site of the most extreme negative consequences of Bt cotton (Shiva et al. 2000; Qayum & Sakkhari 2005) . Farmer catastrophes were joined by reports of deaths of sheep that ate Bt cotton leaves (February 2006) , later joined by reported deaths of cattle (February 2007) . Both incidents came from NGOs in Andhra Pradesh (Rao 2007) .
Despite court stays and state-government bans, Bt cotton hybrids have spread rapidly and widely in India. Despite talk of 'monopoly,' by 2007 there were 137 officially approved Bt hybrids -up from three in 2002 -involving four genetic events and dozens of firms -in addition to the vigorous illegal 'stealth seed' market of farmer-grown transgenics. Variously called 'indigenous Bt' or 'deshi Bt' or 'Navbharat variants,' farmer-bred Bt hybrids became a cottage industry, especially in Gujarat (Jayaraman 2004; Herring 2005) . The reason for more rapid adoption of illegal over legal transgenic cotton is primarily price, though some farmers believe stealth seeds are better adapted to local conditions: new varieties are produced by hybridizing the transgenic with a local variety (Gupta & Chandak 2004; Roy, Herring & Geisler 2007) .
The virtually universal spread of transgenic cotton in India suggests a presumption that studies finding consistent agro-economic failure have a burden of proof: it is hard to imagine farmers spreading a technology that is literally killing them. Field studies, however, diverge. As a generalization, formal sector studies (industry, government) are most likely to find strongly positive agro-economic effects of Bt cotton, academic studies more mixed but positive, civil-society organization and NGO studies likely to be strongly negative (AC Neilsen 2004; APCoAB 2006; Bambawale et al. 2004; Basavaraj, Patil & Hanchimal 2007; Bennett et al. 2004; Herring 2007e; Kandlikar & Satterfield 2008; Naik 2001; Naik, Qaim, Subramanian & Zilberman 2005; Narayanamoorthy & Kalamkar 2006; Qayum & Sakkhari 2005; Rao 2004; Herring & Geisler 2007; Sahai 2003; Sahai & Rahman 2003; Shiva & Jafri 2004; Zahoor 2004 ). The rough correlation is a confirmation of the caution that data constitute a social product; the conditions of their production affect their correlation to reality (Herring 2003) . As a consequence, a method for digging beneath the surface representation of facts necessitates thinking anew.
It is worth quoting at length the view of perhaps the most influential Indian critic of biotechnology, Dr Vandana Shiva, who is also the dominant force in representing India to progressive fora around the world. On studies of Bt cotton she wrote (Shiva 2006b ):
However, every study in India carried out by citizen groups and government shows that Indian farmers are losing not just incomes but lives. In Madhya Pradesh, in Badwani, Khargaon, Dhar and Khandwa districts, almost half the 42 farmers visited reported that their crop had failed. Khargaon farmers faced total crops failure. In the other districts only one expected a yield of 12.5 quintals, the average yield expected by the others was 4.01 quintals, as compared to the 15 quintals promised by Monsanto-Mahyco. In Karnataka, 15 of the 40 farmers visited in Bellary, Sirippupa and Haveri/Dharwad districts, expected a total failure of their crops.
Failure according to these studies of citizen groups had specific biological/agronomic deficiencies that reduced yields:
In most of the fields visited, the Bt. cotton plants were in a stage of maturity with leaves turning red before dropping off. … According to Dr. Jalapathi Rao, this was probably due to the toxin gene ... unlike other hybrid cotton, which yields up to March, Bt. cotton farmers will not get any yield after November-December. … The income of Bt cotton farmers is being reduced not just because of low yields, but also because of staple size. … it is hardly 15-20 mm… (ibid) Reports of failure were heavily concentrated in one region -the State of Andhra Pradesh, in South India. There were no studies of failure known to me in the State of Gujarat, where the making of transgenic cotton hybrids became a cottage industryalbeit an illegal one (Jayaraman 2004; Gupta & Chandak 2005) .
Field studies yield contradictory results from contested data. To investigate explanations for this phenomenon, a team of social and natural scientists 1 visited Warangal district in December of 2006. Team composition was intentionally broad and consequential: we had linguistic competence in Telegu and Hindustani, both of which are usable in the Telengana region of Andhra Pradesh. Among us, we had expertise in molecular biology, plant genetics, agronomics, political economy, rural administration and regulation. All these strands of expertise turned out to be useful.
Our research strategy immediately ruled out another conventional agronomic study. Every study with results reporting positive agronomic effects of the technology is dismissed by opponents for bias introduced by corporate or state sponsorship. Studies finding crop failure are criticized for lacking scientific rigor and transparency (Shantharam 2005) .
The science is politicized, perhaps hopelessly so. Moreover, a meta-analysis of studies proved frustrating: some studies by local groups are not generally available, nor are sampling techniques always specified, nor yield measurement, among many other factors that make studies non-comparable. Instead, we began to look for mechanisms that might explain divergent interpretations of the Bt experience on the farm in a district that has produced more horror stories about Bt cotton than any other. Our assumption was that mechanisms of data dispersion would be more observable in Warangal than in other sites. We picked the anomalous case, as it was representative of the puzzle.
We began with a question of how widespread the Bt cotton phenomenon was in the district. Farmer behavior seemed a plausible proxy measure for agroeconomic effects on farm in the face of contradictory findings in surveys. Though individual farmers make mistakes at particular times, it is hard to imagine that a technology available legally since 2002, and illegally since 1999, would be adopted widely if as flawed as some studies suggested. One of these studies, conducted in Warangal district, found dis-adoption of Bt cotton after crop failure and loss of income (Qayum & Sakkhari 2005) . In contrast, the all-India data show adoption rates to have been very high in the state in the same period, higher in fact than in other states of India (Herring 2007e) . How could this be true if crop failure were common? To get an aggregate view of adoption rates, we began in the state's capital, Hyderabad.
Interviews with local representatives of seed companies converged on an interpretation inconsistent with the crop-failure and dis-adoption scenario: growth in demand for Bt cotton seeds was exceptional. Nuziveedhu Seeds had in 2006 put out its first transgenic cotton, on license from Mahyco-Monsanto Biotech Ltd (MMBL) and found demand far exceeding supply; they produced 10,000 (450 gm) seed packets, demand was around 40,000. Equally telling, representatives from firms reported large quantities of unsold conventional seeds; demand for these seeds dropped as Bt hybrids became available. 2 Farmers throughout the state were switching to Bt hybrids; the local seed industry was planning to expand transgenic offerings. These trends cannot be decisive evidence of on-farm success of the technology. But if markets work, and firms and farmers are rational, it would be hard to reconcile these trends with a failed technology.
How widespread was Bt technology? The Director of the Andhra Pradesh Seed Certification Agency in Hyderabad estimated that Bt hybrids constituted 85-90 percent of the cotton area in the State. Yet it remains possible that industry and government estimates of a state-wide phenomenon may conceal local variance at the district level. We moved on to Warangal District. First, we consulted with scientists at the agricultural research station at Angrau, the most senior of whom was cited as an authority by Shiva et al. in Seeds of Suicide (2000) . These researchers estimated that 80-90 percent of the cotton in the district was Bt. We got similar estimates from officers in the Government of India's Department of Agriculture in Warangal town; their estimate for the district was 95 percent of the cotton cropping area to be in transgenic cotton. 3 We subsequently checked this number with local seed merchants, who estimated a somewhat higher figure of 98 percent. Some of them had ceased to stock non-transgenic cotton hybrids as there was no demand for them; their perception of the market matched that of state-level commercial seed companies. These numbers are consonant with the conclusion of anthropologist Glenn Stone's (2007) detailed empirical work in Warangal district: farmers were adopting Bt cotton with such alacrity that it was 'more than innovation adoption, more than a tipping point: it was a craze. ' We explicitly asked the major NGOs in Secunderabad about this anomaly: why were farmers adopting a technology that failed them? One response was that non-Bt cotton seeds were becoming unavailable in the market, forcing farmers to plant Bt cotton. They also argued that farmers had been duped by commercial propaganda; one said 'farmers in Europe are ten times more sophisticated than our farmers.' That is, there was a gullible-peasant narrative in the NGO sector. The critical question then became: are farmers duped or irrational in buying ever larger numbers of seeds that fail (Herring 2007c)? Triangulation among official and scientific sources confirmed high rates of adoption, comparable to other districts in India. Could we ascertain reasons for farmer adoption by investigating their experiences?
We walked farmers' fields, and held discussions with farmers in groups and individually in villages of Kadipikonda (Hanumakonda Mandal), Kapulakanaparthi (Sangyem Mandal), Dharmaram (Beejakonda Mandal), Uggonipalli and Ustarapalli (both in Atmakur Mandal), and Yellampalli (Chityala Mandal). Our sampling procedure was not preplanned, or consciously random, but there are advantages to this determined informality. We believed -all of us from previous field experiencethat local knowledge is inter-subjective and widely held; that representative villages or fields are in fact never quite representative; that many contestable decisions are made in sampling frames; and that farming outcomes will generally be known by farmers. It is difficult and pointless to assign discrete numbers to the interviews, as collective discussions inevitably ensue when three strangers show up in a village. People congregate. They see that we are genuinely interested in their experience and that we know agriculture. The advantage of groups is that if one person makes a mistake, she is challenged by others, or at least one learns that there is a controversy. Publicity is a corrective mechanism. Walks through an individual farmer's field are also instructive, as one can query specific decisions and evidence. Farmers like to talk about their fields.
The conclusion we drew from these talks is confirmation of the larger story in India -and incidentally of the one NGO in Hyderabad that found through its studies positive effects of transgenic cotton hybrids. 4 Harvestable yields generally improve, and with them net incomes. Bt cotton reduces pest damage through the action of the pro-toxin Cry1Ac, lethal to lepidopterans, reducing the need for spraying bollworms, thus reducing cash outlays for pesticides, thus debt. Farm laborers' health is improved, and it is easier to hire labor when field sprayings of toxins are reduced. Bt cotton pays the farmer, the extent of payment varying with the level of pest infestation; in heavy pest years, the technology saves crops; in moderate or low infestations, the cost of the seed -if there is a premium, which is not always the case -is subjectively discounted as insurance. Currently in India, this is relatively inexpensive insurance (about USD 7.50 (Rs 350) per acre) with lower pesticide expenditure as an additional benefit in most seasons. This insurance is of course less expensive with Bt stealth seeds, as discussed below.
These are consensual farmer views; but could the farmers have been duped by multinational hype, as reported by NGOs interviewed in Hyderabad? There was one complaint about seed dealers' misleading farmers by saying that their Bt cotton would not need any pesticide spray. The Cry1Ac gene codes for a single protein; it provides protection against bollworms, but nothing else. 5 This fact seemed to be generally understood in 2006, but early years of introduction witnessed more propaganda in which dealers oversold the virtues of the cultivars. We asked parallel questions to officers of the District Agricultural Office (DAO), Warangal. One Joint Director and four Deputy Directors monitor cultivation. The DAO estimated that for the past two years 95 per cent of cotton in the Warangal District was Bt and that chemical pesticide application had come down by over 50 per cent. Their rough estimate was that Bt cotton yields averaged eight quintals (800 kg) per acre, whereas non-Bt varieties gave only two to three quintals. As discussed below, these estimates can be taken only as impressionistic, and would vary with pest infestation, but they were made by officers with regular contact with farmers and seed agents.
The farmers' and officials' view of the technology was supported by the agro-chemical dealers we interviewed in their shops with farmers coming and 1 14 49 9
Whose numbers count? Probing discrepant evidence on transgenic cotton in the Warangal district of India going. Their livelihood depends on monitoring farmer behavior and responding appropriately; it is their ox that is gored if the hype turns sour. During the 2006-07 crop season local chemical pesticide sales were down by 60 percent, to about Rs 3 crore from Rs 7 to 8 crore. Some pesticide dealers had lost half of their cotton pesticide business; some others reportedly lost 80%, some closed shop. They confirmed that there is still spraying for sucking insects in cotton, and sometimes overly-cautious excessive spraying for bollworms, but the reduction of pesticide use was pegged at around 50% by farmers and agro-chemical dealers. The health of farm laborers was cited by most as a benefit of Bt; workers were increasingly reluctant to work in the toxindrenched fields, despite their low incomes. The notion that 'Bt has failed' was incomprehensible, even risible, to people who sell and grow Bt cotton.
Field results from triangulating among agricultural scientists, the local state, agro-chemical dealers and farmers correspond to the Indian Council for Agricultural Research and academic studies at the all-India level. Warangal is not exceptional: Bt cotton technology is adopted by farmers for increasing profits, and reducing poisoning of soil, water and people with toxic pesticides.
C Co on ns se eq qu ue en nt ti ia al l r re ep po or rt ts s o of f f fa ai il lu ur re e o of f B Bt t C Co ot tt to on n i in n W Wa ar ra an ng ga al l
Warangal is the only district in India in which compensation for the failure of Bt cotton was paid by Mahyco-Monsanto; Andhra Pradesh is the only state to have rejected re-certification of Bt hybrids on grounds of agronomic failure. These facts sit uneasily with our field results. We asked everyone we talked to: why is there so much press about failure of Bt cotton in Warangal?
In our discussions, few people in Warangal knew that Warangal was famous for failure of Bt cotton; no one knew that there was a 'GMO-free zone' of international reputation in the district. But everyone agreed on one point: in the semi-arid Telengana region, growing unirrigated cotton is extremely risky, especially in thin red soils. The Andhra Pradesh Department of Agriculture has long cautioned against this practice, particularly in areas where the annual rain fall is less than 60 cm and not distributed uniformly across the cropping season. Rainfall in the district is uncertain in both aggregate quantity and in timing; irrigation is limited; appropriate soils are not universal; crop failures are common. The entire region has experienced inadequate rainfall since 2001. 6 This conclusion assumes much greater importance as climate change exposes more land to these conditions of vulnerability across India.
Assured irrigation and good soils are critical for cotton production in Warangal -as the Government has warned. Failures of specific fields of cotton were thought of as largely biological: soils and water. An additional local explanation of crop failure in some fields involved land tenure. Some people suggested that the leasing of land by farmers from coastal Andhra was increasing as land rents in that area increased. There were two consequences, one agronomic, one economic. Farmers from outside the area were thought to be less familiar with local conditions and soils. Moreover, paying the lease cost detracted from their net farming revenue, sometimes producing a loss. There are no reliable data on the extent of leasing, nor of crop failure on leased land, but this is a plausible scenario.
In 2004, cotton did badly in Warangal, Bt or non-Bt. Farmers said that when the rains are poor, Bt and non-Bt cotton fail on rain-fed lands with thin soils, whereas both do well on irrigated heavy soils. In much of the district, cotton risks are high. It is then puzzling that anyone grows cotton if soil and moisture conditions create so much risk, especially for those who cannot bear much risk -the smaller farmers with shallow pockets and perennial debt. Farmers answered that few crops did better; the very drought-resistant millets, for example, were more reliable, but brought little income and were difficult to market. Other cash crops such as peanuts were as vulnerable as cotton. But cotton had one great advantage: it was a crop that could 'change your life': a large harvest, when prices are good, could turn around a household economy in ways not plausible with other crops. The lure of 'white gold' is deeply rooted.
Reports of the 'failure of Bt cotton' had material consequences and fed into formation of new interests that may distort reporting of yield data. Agitation around cotton crop losses in 2004 led to the refusal of the state government to recommend recertification of Mahyco-Monsanto's Bt hybrids for use in Andhra Pradesh. Moreover, Mahyco-Monsanto Biotech Limited was forced to pay Warangal cotton farmers significant compensation for reputed failure of their seeds: Rs 3.27 crores. 7 But if Bt cotton had been no more susceptible to failure in 2004 than any other cotton, why was Mahyco-Monsanto forced to withdraw cotton hybrids from Andhra Pradesh? One local explanation was commercial competition: Nuziveedu Seeds of Secunderabad wanted this outcome, and is politically well connected in Andhra Pradesh. Mahyco is a firm from Maharashtra, a neighboring state, and Monsanto a much-reviled multinational from St. Louis. Nuziveedu then produced two competing Bt hybrids, Mallika Bt and Bunny Bt, both popular with farmers we met. Removal of Mahyco-Monsanto's seeds from the state's market would benefit Nuziveedu. Others said that representatives of MMBL were 'arrogant' and refused to pay the bribes demanded for re-approval of their seeds for a second three-year period; others simply attributed the outcome to 'politics and personalities.' 8 But no one we talked with thought that MMBL Bt seeds were any more likely to fail than non-Bt cotton hybrids.
MECH 12 was one of the Bt hybrids decertified in Andhra Pradesh. The first farmer I spoke with, in Kadipikonda, Hanumakonda mandal, undermined the Bt failure story directly. To my standard question -'what cotton do you grow and why?' he answered: 'MECH 12 because of large bolls, easy picking, early flowering, bollworm resistance.' 9 I asked if it were not now illegal in Andhra; he said yes, he traveled three hours by bus to Nanded in Maharashtra to get the seeds after they were removed from local markets. As I looked skeptical at this story -it's a long ride for a canister of seeds that are officially determined to be unreliable -he gave me an empty Mahyco-Monsanto MECH 12 canister to solidify his claim; it sits on my desk as a reminder of farmer agency.
We next explored an alternative hypothesis: spurious seeds. Could it be that farmers buy seeds labeled as Bt that actually lack the Cry1Ac transgene for insect protection? How would anyone know? This hypothesis is plausible because of the 'craze' for Bt cotton reported in the district reported by Stone (2007) and our earlier finding of shortages of Bt hybrids due to excess demand at the state level. We found from the Andhra Pradesh State Seed Certification Agency that no certified seeds of Bt cotton are on offer, as none are officially notified. Certification of any seed is voluntary; there has been no application for certification of Bt cotton seed. While there are facilities within the agency for testing genetic purity, including the Bt event, most seed certification is limited to seed viability and germination studies.
This hypothesis is plausible: in the absence of certification and regulation, spurious seeds are inevitable. There has been confusion around seed marketing, with commercial hype and false claims, especially in the early years, when dealers were exaggerating the benefits of Bt technology. Spurious seeds are locally called 'duplicates' (the English word is used). Duplicates are made by unscrupulous dealers who change the name on the seed packet marginally to fool the buyer. Some farmers in Kadipikonda gave us a local example: changing the printed name on the seed canister from Mahyco to Mahaco. In response, MMBL has added a holographic image to their canisters, more difficult to counterfeit. These duplicates do not contain the Bt transgene, and therefore give no protection against bollworms. Some farmers 'without knowledge' do buy the duplicates, and suffer thereby. But our interlocutors felt that it was hard to fool a farmer twice. Nevertheless, farmers reporting Bt cotton failure could indeed be experiencing spurious seed failure: ie the technology is not contained in the germplasm of seeds labeled as Bt. The spurious seeds may well be F2 generation seeds of mixed parentage straight from the gins. 10 Had this possibility been taken into account in NGO studies that concluded with Bt cotton failure? One crore equals ten million, 3.27 crores roughly USD 778,000.
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When the Genetic Engineering Approval Committee decided not to renew MMBL's hybrids, they did so without any evidence on yields and performance, but at the request of the state government. Interviews, GEAC, New Delhi, July 2005.
We interviewed G.V Ramanjaneyulu and Kavita Gurukanti at the offices in Secunderabad of the Center for Sustainable Agriculture -one of the leading anti-biotechnology NGOs in India. They confirmed that no one is testing actual cotton plant tissue to see if the Cry1Ac protein is present. There is a simple and inexpensive field test kit available in India, though it is not completely reliable. Therefore we can not rule out the hypothesis that some farmers believing that their Bt cotton has failed -ie does not provide bollworm protection -are not actually growing Bt cotton, but spurious seeds of uncertain genetics.
Also circulating in the agricultural economy are genuine Bt seeds that are not approved by government. These 'stealth seeds' are part of a common global phenomenon (Herring 2007b) . Where legal transgenics are either too expensive or too difficult to obtain, farmers world wide have resorted to underground markets, sometimes across national borders, to obtain illicit transgenics beneath the radar of firms and states. Both stealth seeds and duplicates are present in Warangal. Some stealth seeds are known as 'Kurnool Bt,' named for the district in which they are grown; these are sold by farmers who grow Bt seeds for the major seed companies, but distribute a portion of their harvest through other (unauthorized) channels. These seeds from Kurnool district have the alternate local name of 'gudda Bt' for the cloth bags in which they come. These illegal seeds are farmer-produced, like those that are branded in Gujarat with specific names (Agni, Rakshak, Luxmi, etc) and called generically Navbharat variants. The seeds sell for Rs 500-600 per packet, as opposed to Rs 750 for official seeds. There are no guarantees; dealers are not backing them, unlike the situation in Gujarat's underground cottage Bt seed industry (Gupta & Chandak 2005) . Farmers have little recourse should these seeds fail.
Duplicates are frauds on the farmers, but many of the stealth seeds are quite good, as in Gujarat . We met by accident a farmer who came into the research station at Angrau for help with an irrigation problem. In casual conversation, he confirmed the quality of stealth seeds, though not those from nearby Kurnool. He himself had grown 'Gujarat Bt,' meaning a Navbharat 151 variant, unlabelled, and obtained what he considered a phenomenal yield: 15 quintals. He had originally tried the stealth seeds after a neighbor had done well with them. This is a fairly typical farmer pattern: comparing notes with neighboring farmers and trying out seeds reported to be outstanding (Roy, Herring & Geisler 2007) . This practice accounts for gray-market seeds we found growing as well: seeds approved for cultivation in one area but not in Warangal, or seeds still under testing in the pre-approval stage. One farmer we met was growing Bollgard II (the two-gene stacked BGII), purchased in Nanded, Maharashtra, on three acres. He is satisfied with the hybrid, but it was not yet approved for Andhra Pradesh. On one acre he was growing the Bt hybrid Brahma, and on another MECH 12, both of which also were then not approved for growing in the state.
Spurious seeds are certainly responsible for some mis-reading of outcomes; the extent is obviously unknown, and very hard to determine: a moving target. Dr KR Kranthi, a leading cotton scientist working in India's Central Institute for Cotton Research, has observed from their studies that 'on average, 28 percent of the illegal seed brands are non-Bt. Among samples collected and tested by the CICR, only 26 percent of the Bt cotton was true first-generation hybrid, while 46 percent was contaminated with non-Bt cotton (Padma 2006) . ' In sum, there are plausible causes for innocent errors in reporting failures of cotton technology. 11 Under conditions of genetic anarchy among seeds, no one can decisively claim that a particular technology has failed. It seems that the learning curve is steep: farmers figure out quickly what sources are reliable and what technologies work. They cannot afford to do otherwise, despite inevitable gaps and lags in information. The overall picture was one of a successful but limited technology very popular with farmers for reasonable reasons: neither a 'craze' (Stone 2007 ) nor false-consciousness.
We then asked: why do NGOs report the general failure of Bt cotton in Warangal, and in Andhra Pradesh more generally? Some interlocutors seemed genuinely perplexed; others had darker interpreta-tions: 'it is an open secret that they are paid by the pesticide lobby.' We pressed for evidence of this strong claim. No one we interviewed had any hard evidence; even the question: 'who exactly is the pesticide lobby?' drew no real response. Interestingly, the same formulation one hears in Delhi is repeated locally: 'everyone knows this.' Even a former agriculture minister in Delhi has made this comment, and it has been stated in Parliament (Herring 2006) .
A new hypothesis emerged from these investigations: that there are material interests in reports of the failure of Bt cotton. Such claims proved hard to track down in any direct way. This is a familiar methodological problem. Suppose we ask the question: do lobbyists get political favors in return for gifts to politicians? It is conventional wisdom that the answer is decisively: 'yes, of course, everyone knows that.' Yet the quid pro quo remains generally elusive; convictions are rare. The Bt failure story seemed plausibly related to political and material interests. Because something is hard to detect does not mean it is not true.
F FI IR RM M C CO ON NC CL LU US SI IO ON NS S A AN ND D N NE EW W H HY YP PO OT TH HE ES SE ES S
The Warangal probe established several conclusions that are grounded in field conditions approached from multiple standpoints and interests. Our most important and certain conclusion is that the story of Warangal as an exemplar of Bt cotton failure cannot be sustained. As a consequence, whatever tragic suicides may occur in the district, Bt cotton cannot be responsible: the technology does not cause crop failure or indebtedness in comparison with other cotton cultivars. In fact, the opposite appears more plausible empirically.
The probe also raised new hypotheses about plausible causation, but no certainty. The discussion will proceed from strong conclusions about possible sources of conflicting results of field studies of transgenic cotton in India (and by extension in other contexts where there is controversy surrounding biotechnology) to suggestions about the interplay of interests and social production of data.
F FI IR RM M C CO ON NC CL LU US SI IO ON NS S 1 1. . I In nd de ep pe en nd de en nt t v va ar ri ia ab bl le e s sp pe ec ci if fi ic ca at ti io on n: : G Ge et tt ti in ng g b bi io ol lo og gy y r ri ig gh ht t First, and most obviously, studies will diverge in results if there is mis-specification of the thing being measured, in this case the independent variable. Field studies in India virtually always fail to distinguish performance of Bt technology from performance of specific cultivars. Each hybrid of cotton will contain different germplasm. Bt confers a trait; some hybrids with this trait do better than others. Because of vast agronomic differences, cultivars that work well in one region, district, farm, or even field, may fare less well in the next. There is one methodological solution: isogenic varieties must be compared, one with and one without the transgene, to isolate the effect of the trait.
None of the claims of Bt failure compare two isogenic cultivars, one with and one without the Bt gene, to assure control of varietal characteristics. 12 Varietal characteristics such as staple length, boll size, seed density and sensitivity to wilt have been attributed in failure studies to 'Bt cotton,' but the Cry1Ac gene has no biological connection to these phenotypic variations. All disadvantageous variance across over time and space -which will be extreme in India -is attributed to the Bt trait. There is no known biological mechanism that could produce this result. The Cry1Ac gene codes for a single protein; there is no mechanism for production of that protein -lethal to Lepidoptera -to cause staples to shorten or leaves to wilt. These characteristics are in the germplasm of the hybrid into which the Bt gene is inserted. Farmers in Andhra Pradesh can choose Bunny with or without Bt, and Mallika with and without Bt -both popular hybrids for many reasons. The Bunny and Mallika labels each indicates a specific aggregation of germplasm, to which one may or may not add a Bt trait that makes the seeds more expensive and more pest-resistant.
Reasons for variance in performance of cultivars are not always discernable, either by farmers or researchers. There are many unmeasured variables in complex interactions, including micro-climate, soil ecology, soil chemistry, pest incidence, water timing, and nutrient availability. These variables, and their interaction, vary over time and space. For example, the most criticized official Bt hybrid, MMBL MECH 184, does well for some farmers in some years, but wilts when subjected to early moisture stress. This agronomic characteristic is true of the cultivar with or without the Bt trait. Some farmers -typically those with good water controlfind MECH 184 their best producer (Roy, Herring & Geisler 2007) . This agronomic characteristic of the hybrid is probably the source of the many NGO reports that 'Bt cotton causes leaf wilt.' 2 2. . S Sp pu ur ri io ou us s S Se ee ed ds s Spurious seeds are pervasive, in part because of the popularity of insect-resistant transgenic cotton, and partly because of lack of regulation and certification of cotton seeds. Some varieties sold as Bt are not; some farmers honestly but mistakenly believe that their Bt crop has failed. Market characteristics reinforce the problem of identifying what seeds are failing or succeeding. Shortages of Bt hybrids appeared when demand outstripped supply; hustlers rushed in to fill the niche. Seeds are sold through many unregulated channels; price differences are large, creating an incentive for farmers to go for the unbranded bargain Bt over the official but expensive Bt. Some unofficial Bt hybrids yield very well, better in fact than the original MMBL hybrids (Roy 2006) . There is no way for farmers to verify the quality of these seeds, or their Bt trait. One reason many farmers prefer official seeds to the farmer-bred 'variants' (Maharakshak, Luxmi, 151, Kurnool Bt, etc.) is the firm's reputation for reliable seed quality -high germination rates, seed purity. There is a simple and inexpensive field test for the Bt protein in plant tissues, developed in Nagpur at the Central Institute of Cotton Research, but NGO activists said that they did not know of any study that employs this critical check, nor is any published to my knowledge.
3 3. . F Fa ai il lu ur re e t to o C Co on nt tr ro ol l f fo or r C Cu ul lt ti iv va ar rs s
Poor performance of some Mahyco-Monsanto hybrids in some settings has been attributed to transgenic technology by political contamination: 'Monsanto's seeds have failed.' Yet relative failure of some hybrids has nothing to do with recombinant-DNA techniques for introgressing Cry genes nor the company sold them; the fault seems to lie in the original germplasm into which the Bt gene was inserted. No one who knows cotton well in India would consider the original three MMBL hybrids especially outstanding cultivars, yet they got the first Bt gene. Cotton hybrids have a fairly short life, generally; new hybrids are continually produced and planted. The three MECH varieties have been around a very long time for cotton hybrids: the open field trials began in 1998. The very nature of the regulatory system ensured that the first official Bt seeds would not be the freshest hybrids; nor was there any reason to expect the best germplasm for the first transgenic plants.
R RE ES SE EA AR RC CH H--D DE ER RI IV VE ED D H HY YP PO OT TH HE ES SE ES S
4 4. . I In nt te er re es st ts s i in n F Fa ai il lu ur re e: : P Pa at th h D De ep pe en nd de en nc cy y Why should the failure-of-Bt-cotton story take root in Warangal, of all the districts in India? Part of the answer derives from path dependency and material interests. Successful demands for financial compensation for Bt-crop failure create incentives to claim poor results. When successful, such demands may enter the repertory of rural survival strategies. There have already been demands for compensation for the sheep and cattle allegedly killed by Bt cotton leaves. Farmers and those who claim to represent them have material interests in reports of failure Warangal's exceptionalism then has path-dependent roots. A previous cotton hybrid, XL-35, marketed by Excel Industries Ltd, of Mumbai, failed on a significant acreage, but only in Warangal district. The company paid compensation even though it was the carry and forward agent who had sold mixed seed as XL-35 when demand for the genuine seeds exceeded supply. The spurious seeds failed; the compensation was in the aggregate about Rs 2.25 crore, but importantly was Rs 2500 per acre, or five times the government rate for crop loss from natural calamities (Reddy 2000; Shiva et al. 2000:79) . When farmers demanded compensation in 2004 for Bt cotton failure, they were relying on an established model of gaining resources. This tactic would not work everywhere. The district administration of Warangal is especially sensitive to rural political protest because of a history of Naxalite (Maoist agrarian insurrectionist) activity. From several conversations with district government officials and a Mahyco-Monsanto agent, we learned that the company considered its seeds blameless, but even Rs 3.27 crore paid in compensation was a small price for staying in the cotton game in Andhra Pradesh, where MMBL has 15 crore of business.
Official declaration of crop failure in 2004 built credibility into the story of Bt failure. Moreover, it was not necessary to actually have a failed crop to receive compensation. To receive payment, farmers needed only certification of loss, available from local officials. Once a case reached the level of the Director of Agriculture for the district, there was no independent investigation of crop failure. Pressure and paybacks worked at the village level. We found evidence at the village level of lack of inspection of fields in which crops were said to have failed. Some farmers with assured irrigation then collected twice: they did well with the new technology and simultaneously got compensated for crop failure. 13 The same mechanism worked in compensation for suicides, for which the district is also known; the state government paid Rs 2 lakhs in 1998 to each family in which a farmer committed suicide but then withdrew the payments when it feared that financial grants were encouraging suicides. But in 2004, with crop losses, pressures for compensation for suicides reemerged. The government agreed, even making retroactive the Rs 2-lakh compensation for 10 years. Claiming compensation required only a government certificate, from police and DAO, that someone had committed suicide. Government payments created material incentives to record deaths as suicides, and to construct suicides as a consequence of agrarian crisis -in which the 'failure of Bt cotton' figured prominently. 14 For local NGOs, the failure of biotechnology means affirmation of their campaigns for alternatives: organic farming and 'GMO-free zones,' both very popular in Europe. Warangal district seems especially densely populated by NGOs, though we lack comparative data on other districts. The Center for Sustainable Agriculture in Secunderabad, for example, sustains four local NGOs in Warangal, including CROPS, which oversees the GMO-free zone of Eenabavi -a hamlet of 30 families sustained by Oxfam Trust, HIVOS-Netherlands, and AEI Luxembourg. The Deccan Development Society lists 18 international funders, all in Europe or Canada; it lists 6 Indian government agencies. These NGOs can be funded to solve problems only if there are problems, or to teach the controversy only if a controversy can be maintained.
NGOs act as brokers for flows from governments and INGOs; their interest is consequently in being recognized (Herring 2006) . One mechanism is dramatic narratives. As Bt cotton becomes normalized by farmers in Andhra Pradesh, new narratives of catastrophe serve the interests of local NGOs. Most recent is that of dead sheep -and later cattle -who eat Bt cotton leaves (Rao 2007 ). This outcome is biologically impossible, as the Genetic Engineering Approval Committee in Delhi quickly observed, but the claim itself gets wide publicity, is difficult to disconfirm on the ground, and has the ring of authenticity as a product of local knowledge. Creation of anxiety is in itself in the interest of NGOs: if the agro-economic battle around Bt is largely lost, new incidents are needed to justify continuing the struggle against the strategic lumping of 'GMOs. ' Tethering campaigns to distal and obscure threats prevents any decisive confrontation with facts, and rests on anxiety about the unknown, which is inexhaustible. Given lack of definitive knowledge, and anxiety, the interest of most citizens is rooted in caution. Indeed, most Indians had no interest whatsoever in Bt cotton, at least before it was discovered that pesticide levels in bottled water and soft drinks had reached alarming levels. Keeping uncertainty alive is clearly in the interest of all who have livelihoods as brokers in the global coalition against biotechnology (Herring 2008 If one believes either that all science is political (or in constructivist terms discourse-driven), or that dis-interested investigation is impossible, the tethering of field reports to truth comes undone. Representation of the most lurid, and often absurd, results -vide dead sheep -resonate internationally because of social-movement dynamics within global coalitions, interconnected media sources and global unease with official science that has often been bent by corporate influence -with sometimes catastrophic results. I seldom give a presentation on agricultural biotechnology anywhere in the world in which someone does not bring up the farmer suicides in India, driven by 'terminator technology' in Bt cotton. Evidence to the contrary -eg widespread replication of illegal seeds and high rates of adoption -simply makes no impact on the catastrophe narrative. Normatively, I conclude that farmers of necessity count carefully; their numbers should count. Farmers we interviewed found positive returns on Bt cotton seeds even when the official seeds were very expensive. Prices have come down significantly and choices of cultivars have expanded greatly. Even small advantages on typically small holdings count in a globally rigged cotton market. Moreover, the technology indeed seems scale-neutral, offering similar benefits to both small farmers and large farmers, assuming access to water and good cotton soil. 16 One benefit of technology contained within the seed is 'trialability:' it is possible to try out small amounts of seed cheaply, expanding planting after assessing performance (Roy 2006) . It is the grounded empirics of farmers trying out new ways to cope with a devastating problem that ratify the technology behind Bt cotton in Warangal, as in India more generally.
Yet it would be rash to uncritically accept farmer adoption as evidence for efficacy of the technology: there have been too many errors historically. But logically the burden of proof falls on studies that indicate a phenomenon logically incompatible with adoption rates exceeding 90% of cotton acreage. Farmers in India have accepted Bt technologywhether official or stealth -with alacrity for its effects on reducing poisons in the fields and improving pest control and incomes. It is impossible to sustain the argument that Warangal is an island of failure amid success -indicating reasons for caution for future transgenics? Should governments take seriously NGO studies that demonstrate that the farmers are falsely conscious? That there should be a moratorium on transgenics? Is the authenticity of 'local knowledge' more compelling than the testimony of farmers voting with their plows in aggregate terms? At a bare minimum, the sincere consumer of studies must recognize the interests involved in its production, the social nature of the production process.
Sensationalist stories of Bt disaster are consequential. Stories coming from India's oppositional NGOs may assist in delaying diffusion of biotechnology -as in India intermittently, but briefly -and deny the technology to some farmers, as has happened in many countries around the world. This essay argues that the narrative of Bt cotton failure in Warangal is inaccurate. Broadly, there are two possible classes of explanation: intentional deception or innocent failures in designing adequate controls in small-scale studies.
Politically, anti-transgenic NGOs have interests in failure of Bt technology, precisely the inverse of farmers' interests in getting the agro-economics right. Could there be intentional deception in field studies, or less egregious cherry-picking of respondents? The answer is clearly yes, and would not be surprising: consider Chris Mooney's (2005) careful study of The Republican War on Science. This interpretation is strengthened by the proliferation of stories of livestock deaths that seem to be completely instrumental -ie, lacking in either mechanism or scientific diagnostics or replicable evidence. Deception is a possible explanation. Nevertheless, this essay has offered alternative explanations: innocent error in finding Bt cotton failure, revolving around germplasm, spurious seeds, trait differentiation. It is no easier to conclude decisively than it is to know whether or not Bush and Blair believed in weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.
Beyond agronomic performance of Bt cotton, there are two large and less manageable policy questions: environmental uncertainties and poverty effects. In this probe we found that economics and environmental integrity coincided: the environmental footprint of cotton in terms of toxins declined with Bt technology. Farmers and pesticide dealers converged on this story, and both have very strong interests in counting accurately. Bt is not a miracle trait, but does help significantly in controlling a devastating enemy of cotton -the bollworm -and thereby in the struggle against pesticide-indebtedness and poisoning.
Assessing impacts on rural poverty remains difficult; much more needs to be known about wages and demand for labor. Landless workers cannot choose what is planted for their livelihoods, but have a deep interest in crop protection. Massive crop failures, as in the bollworm 'rampage' of 2001 in Gujarat -through which Bt cotton was first discovered and popularized -deprive the most vulnerable rural families of income. The Warangal probe suggests more support for the contentious proposition that transgenic agriculture can be pro-poor (Herring 2007d) , contrary to the catastrophe scenarios often found in newspapers.
Precise and valid numbers on yields of Bt cotton in India are hard to come by -for reasons explained above -but the absence of precision of some numbers cannot be a license to manufacture others. In this sea of uncertainty, we do however find an island of solidity: the notion that Bt cotton seeds have proved suicidal, homicidal or genocidal in Warangal bears no relation to conditions on the ground. There are interests in these numbers, which the numbers alone will not reveal. Consequently, the Warangal story makes it more difficult to credit comparable disaster narratives from other cotton-growing districts of India -or other countries where farmers have taken up transgenic seeds. Farmers of necessity count carefully; their numbers should count.
